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I. INTRODUCTION
Sex offenses against women and children may be a more serious problem in
American Indian and Alaska Native communities than any other communities in
the United States. While, on average, a woman in the United States faces a one in
five chance of being raped in her lifetime,' the statistics for American Indian and
Alaska Native women are far graver: they have a one in three chance of being
raped during their lifetimes.2 Amnesty International recently examined the high
rates of sexual assault against Native American women and accused the United
States of failing to meet its international human rights obligations to women and
indigenous peoples. Data on the incidence of child sexual abuse is equally
troublesome. According to federal health statistics, one in every four Native girls
and one in every seven Native boys will be sexually abused.4
Given the foregoing, it should be no surprise that Congress first addressed the
idea of sex offender registration in a law directed at Indian reservations. In 1987, a
teacher at a federal Bureau of Indian Affairs school on the Hopi reservation was
arrested for the sexual abuse of as many as 142 boys between 1979 and 1987.5
The teacher, John W. Boone, was prosecuted and convicted, and the federal
government settled a civil action with some of the victims for nearly $50 million.
In response to the wide public outcry following the Boone case, Congress enacted
the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act in 1990 [ICPA].6
Unfortunately, the ICPA was a very modest effort, and Congress ultimately failed
to appropriate any significant funding to implement the law. Though it failed to
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1 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY 22 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles l/nij/18378l.pdf.
2 Id.
3 MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (Amnesty Int' Publications 2007).
4 Dep't of Health and Human Services, Indian Health Service Child Abuse Project, available
at http://www.ovccap.ihs.gov/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
5 Andrea Smith, Soul Wound: The Legacy of Native American Schools, AMNESTY MAG.
(2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/soulwound.htm.
6 25 U.S.C. § 3201(a) (2000).
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produce a sex offender registry, it was a starting point for congressional initiatives
involving sex offender registration, signaling the dawn of a new era in federal
criminal justice policy.
Widespread sexual abuse is only one of the many serious public safety
challenges besetting Indian reservations, a situation exacerbated by enduring
difficulties facing criminal justice on Indian reservations.7  The rules of
jurisdiction, which have been pieced together and fashioned in more than two
hundred years of federal legislation and Supreme Court decisions, have created
what has famously been called a "jurisdictional maze."8 There are currently two
general models for addressing crime on reservations. One prevailing model of
jurisdiction, the Public Law 280 model, locates the responsibilities for law
enforcement and criminal justice with state authorities. 9 Another, the Indian
Country model, locates the responsibilities primarily with the federal government,
with tribal governments working in a limited supporting role.' 0 A good deal of
anecdotal evidence suggests that neither of these models work well, and studies are
underway to provide a clearer, more comprehensive, and more empirical
understanding of the situation. 1
One source of the problems with the existing models is that important public
responsibilities on Indian reservations, such as law enforcement, public safety, and
criminal justice, are assigned to governmental actors who are institutionally
incompetent to meet these substantial responsibilities. Many of the key actors are
unaccountable to the communities for whom they ostensibly work. Others are
simply unfamiliar with the legal, cultural, and geographic terrain.
Congress inadvertently wandered into this "jurisdictional maze" or "maze of
injustice' 12 when it enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
[SORNA] as Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.13 Despite
7 See generally Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 709 (2006); Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 779 (2006).
a See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REv. 503, 508-13 (1976).
9 See generally CARoLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL
AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of
Lawlessness in California Indian County, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1415-19 (1997) (discussing the
effects of Public Law 280); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction
Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 541 (1975).
10 See generally Clinton, supra note 8; Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951 (1975).
1 The authors have been involved in the implementation of a $1.46 million federal grant from
the National Institute of Justice to study the Administration of Criminal Justice in Indian Country
(Principal Investigators: Duane Champagne, Carole Goldberg and Kevin Washburn; Virginia Davis
has consulted on the work).
12 See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 3.
13 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
[Vol 6:3
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
the growing realization of the specific structural problems at play on Indian
reservations, Congress failed to heed the unique jurisdictional arrangements on
Indian reservations and otherwise ignored the special circumstances existing there.
SORNA further complicated the complex jurisdictional regime on Indian lands and
may also have caused unnecessary collateral damage to tribal governmental
interests. Moreover, SORNA faces many obstacles to its own effectiveness on
Indian reservations, owing primarily from its content and design.
This article critiques SORNA and places it in the context of the broader
scheme of public safety and criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations. Part I
briefly explains the jurisdictional background of criminal law and regulatory
authority on Indian lands. Part II discusses the particular development of federal
and tribal sex offender registration and notification laws. Part III explains how
SORNA engages Indian tribes and other registration jurisdictions as a prelude to
discussion of the obstacles of effective implementation on Indian lands. Part IV
offers some criticisms of SORNA for further fragmenting regulatory and criminal
jurisdictional authority on Indian lands, destabilizing existing law enforcement
arrangements, and ignoring recent federal standards of good government in the
federal Indian policy arena. Part V explains some of the other practical problems
that may arise under this hastily enacted law. The conclusion urges Congress to
reconsider SORNA and to adopt a more deliberative approach to these very serious
issues.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE JURISDICTIONAL MAZE ON INDIAN LANDS
Criminal jurisdiction on American Indian reservations involves a tangled web
of statutes, treaties, executive orders, and court decisions, creating overlapping
authority and, occasionally, gaps in jurisdiction. Authority is divided among
federal, tribal, and state governments, depending in part on the location of the
crime, the type of crime, the race of the perpetrator, and the race of the victim. 14
For most of American history, criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations
was primarily a tribal or federal matter. Traditionally, state criminal authority was
thus limited on Indian reservations. To a large degree, reservations were
conceived as sanctuaries from state laws.' 5 Federal common law has, however,
complicated the jurisdictional structure. In United States v. McBratney,16 for
example, the Supreme Court held that states have jurisdiction to prosecute offenses
on Indian reservations that are entirely between non-Indians. Presumably, the
federal and tribal interest in such matters is minimal. McBratney had the effect of
14 See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 729-71 (Nell Newton et al.
eds., 2005).
15 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (holding that the Cherokee Nation was a
place where the laws of Georgia could have no effect); see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 384 (1886) (stating that citizens of states are the Indians' most deadly enemies).
16 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
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making racial status, or perhaps more specifically tribal political status, a key
jurisdictional fact. Much later, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the
Supreme Court added a book end to the McBratney line of cases, holding that
tribes lack jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations. 7 Thus, each realm of
jurisdiction is exclusive.
As a result of these cases, the tribal or non-tribal status of a defendant is key
in determining which government-state, tribal, or federal-has jurisdiction to
prosecute.'8 If an offense involves an Indian as a victim or defendant, it is a
federal or tribal matter. Many large jurisdictions, including Arizona, Montana,
New Mexico, and South Dakota, still operate this way today. In these "Indian
country jurisdictions," states have no jurisdiction over Indians, or crimes involving
Indians, on Indian lands.
In 1953, Congress added a wrinkle that complicated the scheme in some
states. In an experimental effort to reduce the federal responsibility over criminal
justice, Congress enacted a statute commonly known as Public Law 280, in which
it delegated criminal jurisdiction and limited civil jurisdiction on Indian
reservations to six states, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin,
and Alaska, with some exceptions for individual tribes. 19 These states are
commonly referred to as "mandatory PL 280 jurisdictions." Public Law 280
allowed other states to "opt in" to the same regime, and several additional states
accepted jurisdiction over Indian reservations in whole or in part. These states are
collectively known as "optional PL 280 jurisdictions. 20  Taken together, the
jurisdictions in which Public Law 280 applies either as a federal mandate or by the
"opt in" approach are called Public Law 280 jurisdictions.
Public Law 280 was a limited experiment. Its expansion was dramatically
curtailed in 1968, when Congress gave tribes a veto over future state efforts to opt
in. Though Public Law 280 is still in effect, and it continues to allow the existing
jurisdictions to exercise authority over offenses, there is some evidence that Public
Law 280 was a failed experiment.2' Indeed, several states have "retroceded"
authority back to the federal government.
Thus, there are two prevailing models of criminal justice authority on Indian
reservations, the "Public Law 280 model" and the "traditional Indian country
model." Understanding these two models is important in the context of sex
17 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
is See United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001).
'9 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006).
20 Additional states (AZ, FL, ID, IA, MT, NV, ND, UT, and WA) voluntarily assumed all or
part of the jurisdiction offered. See generally CoHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 14, at 573-81.
21 Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First
Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REv. 697 (2006). Indeed, several states have retroceded
criminal jurisdiction back to the federal government. Id. at 725-26.
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offender registration because, as will be discussed in Part 11, SORNA distinguishes
between tribes on this basis.
Of course, a sex offender registration regime also implicates regulatory
concerns. It is not a crime to be a sex offender who has already served his time.
The regime is designed to regulate the activities of such persons on the theory that
they are still dangerous. Under Public Law 280 and other long-standing principles
of federal law, the regulatory regime on Indian lands has long been simpler than
the criminal regime, at least in some ways. While Public Law 280 gave some
states criminal authority on Indian reservations, 22 no states have general regulatory
authority over Indians on Indian reservations. 23 Thus, prior to SORNA, there was
no basis for a state to impose or enforce a sex offender regulatory regime on Indian
lands.
III. HISTORY OF FEDERAL AND TRIBAL SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS
As with the history of the United States itself, the history of federal sex
offender registration begins with American Indians. In 1990 Congress first
addressed the subject of a centralized national registry to track child sexual abuse
offenders on Indian lands. Here, as in most cases involving sexual abuse
legislation, Congress was reactive rather than proactive. When school teacher
John W. Boone startled the national conscience by abusing as many as 142 boys in
a Bureau of Indian Affairs school during a six-year period ending with his arrest in
1987, Congress reacted cautiously and deliberately.
A. The Indian Child Protection Act of 1990
In response to this notorious instance of sexual abuse in reservation schools,
Congress enacted the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act
in 1990 [ICPA].24 The ICPA acknowledged that "multiple incidents of sexual
abuse of children on Indian reservations have been perpetrated by persons
employed or funded by the Federal Government,, 25 and it sought to address the
problem in several ways. First, it established mandatory reporting requirements by
doctors, teachers, social workers, psychiatrists, and law enforcements officials who
learn of child abuse. 26 Second, it required background checks, called "character
investigations," of those federal employees who have regular contact with Indian
22 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006).
23 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987).
24 25 U.S.C. § 3201(a) (2000).
'5 25 U.S.C. § 3201(a)(1)(C) (2000).
26 25 U.S.C. § 3202 (2000).
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children.27 Finally, the law directed the Secretary of the Interior to work with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services to study the
feasibility of establishing a central registry for sex offenders.28 No central registry,
however, was ever implemented, and there seems to be some doubt as to whether
the feasibility study was ever completed.29
Not long thereafter, sex offender registration gained congressional salience in
a much broader context. In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program ("Jacob
Wetterling Act"),3 ° which required all states to implement a sex offender
registration program or forfeit ten percent of their federal law enforcement
funding. 31 The Jacob Wetterling Act required convicted sex offenders to register
their addresses with law enforcement and permitted states to establish community
notification programs.
Prior to the Jacob Wetterling Act, only a few states tracked convicted sex
offenders in any meaningful way.32  In 1996, the Jacob Wetterling Act was
amended, in what was known as "Megan's Law," to require states to develop a
program to notify the community about registered sex offenders. 33 The states were
given broad discretion as to how to conduct these community notification
programs. By 2000, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had sex offender
registration systems and community notification programs, though the details
varied greatly by state. Although the ICPA had been Congress's introduction to
the issue of sex offender registration, institutional memory in Congress can be
weak; Congress neglected to address Indian tribes in any way in the Jacob
Wetterling Act or Megan's Law.
B. Tribal Sex Offender Registration
Like the states, many tribal governments began developing sex offender
monitoring and tracking programs in the 1990s to assist with the prevention of sex
offenses in their communities. As noted, while the data is not currently sufficient
to tie these statistics solely or even primarily to Indian reservations, rates of sexual
27 25 U.S.C. § 3207 (2000).
28 25 U.S.C. § 3204 (2000).
29 See Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act Amendments: Hearing on
S. 1899 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. (Mar. 15, 2006) (Q&A portion by
Senator Dorgan, following Pat Ragsdale's testimony), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109senate-hearings&docid=f:26699.
wais.
30 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).
31 Id.
32 Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, Present, &
Future, 34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. AND Civ. CoNFINEMENT 3, 5 (2008).
33 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (2006).
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violence are higher among Indian women than others in America.34 Moreover,
Department of Justice statistics indicate that American Indian and Alaska Native
women experience seven sexual assaults per one thousand per year, compared to
only three such assaults per one thousand among Black Americans, two per one
thousand among Caucasians, and only one per one thousand among Asian
Americans.35 While data is not currently sufficient to tie these statistics solely or
primarily to Indian reservations, it is clear that sexual abuse of children is also
alarmingly high in American Indian communities.36 Moreover, some evidence
suggests that gaps in criminal jurisdiction and law enforcement on tribal lands have
caused sex offenders to target Indian communities. 37 Many tribal governments
naturally responded to these alarming problems by enacting provisions containing
registration and tracking features.
Tribal sex offender registration codes, like those of the states, have varied in
their scope and requirements. For example, the Tohono O'odham Nation, located
in southern Arizona, adopted a tribal sex offender registration code in 2000 that
includes residence restrictions and provides for community notification.
38
Similarly, the Skokomish Tribe, which is located in Washington State, also
imposes residence restrictions on registered sex offenders and provides for
community notification. 39 The Skokomish Criminal Code, which was adopted in
1998, also requires the Tribal Director of Public Safety to assess the level of risk
posed by each offender and to categorize the offender at one of three risk levels.40
Because of the limitations on tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 41
tribal sex offender registration provisions generally provide different penalties for
34 See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 1, at 22.
35 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 3 (1999), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/aic.htm.
36 See Dep't of Health and Human Services, supra note 4.
37 MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 3; At a 2006 SCIA Hearing, Chairman John McCain stated
that "The Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act was enacted in 1990 in
response to the findings ... that certain BIA schools had become safe havens for child abusers. The
investigation of these crimes revealed that the perpetrators knew that the reporting and investigation
of these heinous acts were in such a sorry state that they would rarely be detected." Hearing before
the Committee on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 1 (2006).
38 Ordinance of the Tohono O'odham Legislative Council, Title 7, ch. 3 (enacted May 10,
2000), available at http://www.arizonanativenet.comlaw/TOCode/PDFsfTitle%207%20ch3.pdf (last
visited June 22, 2008).
39 Skokomish Criminal Code, §§ 9.02B.005-9.02B.095, available at
http://www.skokomish.org/SkokConstitution&Codes/Codes/STC9-02B.htm (last visited June 22,
2008).
40 Id. § 9.02B.020.
41 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (stating that tribes lack criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (stating that tribes have
jurisdiction over Indians who are not tribal-members); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324, 333 (1983) ("A tribe's power to exclude non-members entirely or to condition their
presence on the reservation is ... well established.").
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Indian and non-Indian violators. Indian violators are generally subject to some
period of incarceration. 42  In the case of non-Indian violators, the tribal codes
generally provide for the exclusion of the non-Indian violator from tribal lands.43
The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians adopted a provision giving members of the
tribe the right to petition for exclusion of an individual from tribal lands for failure
to register.44 Additionally, a number of tribal sex offender codes require tribal law
enforcement officers to input sex offender registration information into the
National Criminal Information Center [NCIC] database so that the information is
nationally available.45 A census of tribal justice agencies conducted by the Bureau
of Justice Statistics in 2002 found that fifty-four tribal governments were routinely
submitting information on tribal sex offenders to the National Sex Offender
Registry.46
From 2002-2005, a series of high profile cases involving sex offenders who
had crossed state lines to re-offend fueled a movement for increased uniformity in
sex offender registration systems across jurisdictions.47  Meanwhile, the
constitutionality of Alaska's sex offender registration and community notification
law was challenged in the United States Supreme Court. In 2003, in Smith v.
Doe,48 the Court upheld Alaska's law against a challenge under the Ex Post Facto
Clause, rebuffing the claim that the law constituted retroactive punishment.
The Court's holding in Smith v. Doe, that sex offender registration is
regulatory in nature, rather than punitive, was keenly relevant on Indian
reservations. Because states generally lack regulatory authority on Indian lands,
even in Public Law 280 jurisdictions,49 the decision suggested that state sex
offender registration schemes could not apply to Indians on Indian lands. It did not
take long for this issue to reach the courts.
42 See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribal Code, ch. 4, §§ 4.20, 4.22 (enacted Jan. 2000),
available at http://www.wmat.nsn.us/Legal/Criminal.html#SECTION%204.22 (last visited June 22,
2008).
43 See, e.g., Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians Tribal Code, § 14-50.13 (adopted Oct. 27,
2000), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/eccodech l4criminallawpt2.htm#10
(last visited June 22, 2008).
44 Id. § 14-50.12.
45 See, e.g., Tohono O'odharn Nation Tribal Code, supra note 38.
46 STEVEN PERRY, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN INDIAN
COUNTRY iii (2002).
47 Susanne Nadeau, Child Protection: Bush Signs Dru's Law - Bill Calls for Closer
Monitoring of Sex Offenders, Harsher Penalties, GRAND FORKS HERALD, July 28, 2006; Audrey
McAvoy, Walsh: Federal Bill for Slain Son Overdue, AP WORLDSTREAM, July 27, 2006.
48 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
did not violate the constitutional proscription of ex post facto criminal laws because the act was civil
and regulatory rather than criminally-punitive in nature).
49 See Bryan v. Itasca County, 246 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1976); California v. Cabazon Band of
Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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In State v. Jones,50 Minnesota state courts were asked to consider the
application of Minnesota's sex offender registration law to Indian lands. Jones, a
member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, who resided on the reservation, was
charged by state authorities with failing to comply with Minnesota's registration
law.5' Jones moved for dismissal on the ground that the registration law was civil
in nature, rather than criminal, and therefore the state lacked jurisdiction over tribal
52members residing on Indian reservations. The trial court granted the motion, and
the state appealed, arguing that sex offender registration is criminal in nature and
thus a state responsibility under Public Law 280.53
While Minnesota continued its efforts to prosecute Jones for failing to
register, tribal leaders from many of the ten Indian reservations in Minnesota
began negotiating with the State Attorney General to find a political solution that
would close the gap in sex offender registration that existed on many
reservations. 54 The tribal governments that did not have registration requirements
in place enacted tribal sex offender registration codes. Many of the tribes also
entered into a Memoranda of Understanding ["MOU"] with the Minnesota
Attorney General that set forth the obligations of the state and each tribe. Because
the circumstances of the tribes varied with respect to their location, population
size, relationships with local enforcement agencies, and access to resources, the
MOUs were each individually negotiated. This allowed the state and tribes to
negotiate the best distribution of authorities based on the individual circumstances
of each tribe rather than imposing a one-size-fits-all solution.
Meanwhile, tribes across the country began advocating for a tribal sex
offender registration mechanism that would enable them to share critical public
safety information. As a result, a provision was included in Title IX of the
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act ["VAWA"], which was
signed into law on January 5, 2006. ss Section 905 of VAWA authorized one
million dollars a year for five years to be granted to a tribe or tribal organization to
help develop both a national tribal sex offender and an order of protection
registry.5 6 Consistent with the long-standing federal policy of respect for tribal
self-determination, 7 the VAWA provision was flexible and would create a
50 State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2007).
51 Timothy J. Droske, The New Battleground for Public Law 280 Jurisdiction: Sex Offender
Registration in Indian Country, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 897, 898 (2000).
52 Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2007).
53 All of the reservations in Minnesota are subject to PL 280 jurisdiction with the exception of
the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians.
54 Droske, supra note 51, at 915.
55 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-162, § 905(b), 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
56 id.
57 In 1970 President Richard Nixon announced a new federal Indian policy of "self-
determination" for Indian nations that has been reaffirmed by every subsequent President. Message
2008]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
voluntary registry available for the use of all tribal governments.
Six months later, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act was
enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act [AWA].
Indian tribes likely made the radar screen in the AWA because of the high profile
issue being litigated in State v. Jones. It is impossible to be certain, however,
because the legislative history of the AWA is virtually non-existent.58 Despite
having its origin in several related bills during preceding sessions,59 the ultimate
version moved through Congress with tremendous speed and little deliberation,
passing the Senate by unanimous consent and the House by an overwhelming vote
shortly after being introduced and reported out of committee.
Despite the apparent lack of deliberation, the AWA contained a sharp change
in course from the perspective of tribes. While the language authorizing the
national tribal registry in VAWA was broad and flexible, Congress took a very
different approach in SORNA. SORNA created a complicated scheme for
including Indian tribes and imposed a wide-range of requirements. Since no
hearings were held exploring the unique needs of tribal communities during the
consideration of SORNA, existing efforts to track sex offenders on tribal lands
were not considered by Congress. Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of
SORNA suggests that the drafters of the legislation were aware of the tribal sex
offender registry provision included in VAWA only six months earlier.
SORNA raised issues for Indian tribal governments in two important ways.
First, SORNA made it a federal offense for an individual who has been convicted
of a qualifying sex offense in tribal court to fail to register in the jurisdiction where
the offender works, lives, and attends school.60 Second, SORNA required all
jurisdictions to include tribal court convictions for qualifying sex offenses in their
registries.61 On its face, the recognition of tribal convictions is a positive
from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc.
No. 91-363, at 3 (1970).
58 See Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRm. L. 51 (2008).
59 See, e.g., Children's Safety Act of 2005, H.R. 3132, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced on
June 30, 2005, by House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner). See also H.R. 3133,
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (introduced on June 30, 2005, by Rep. Mark
Foley). Rep. Mark Foley also introduced House Bill 4905, on March 8, 2006, which was a slightly
different version of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, and which ultimately was
adopted as § 127 of the Adam Walsh Act. Foley resigned later in the year on charges that he had
inappropriate relationships with Congressional pages. See Jeff Zeleny, House's Program for
Teenagers is No Stranger to Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, October 1, 2006, § 1, at 26.
'o 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2000). The Department of Justice has issued Guidelines instructing that
this registration requirement has retroactive application. DOJ Final Guidelines to implement
SORNA, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030-38,070 (July 2, 2008).
61 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111(6), 120
Stat. 587 (2006). The Adam Walsh Act also included an amendment to the Major Crimes Act that
has significant implications for tribal communities that is not discussed in this article. Section 215 of
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normative development from the perspective of tribal courts. It extends a
legitimacy to tribal convictions that is otherwise typically lacking under federal
law. 62 However, the lack of uniformity is, itself, somewhat troubling. In elevating
tribal sex offense convictions above other tribal convictions and tribal civil
judgments, the United States could be accused of being selective and capricious. 63
Thus, using tribal convictions in this manner may say more about the general
congressional antipathy toward sex offenders than congressional respect for tribal
court judgments.
Once SORNA was enacted, the result in the Minnesota case, State v. Jones,
became irrelevant, at least as a policy matter.64 While the litigation had called
attention to what many observers considered to be a gap in the nation's ability to
track sex offenders and likely spawned congressional attention to the matter in
SORNA, the law's enactment implicitly conceded the defendant's argument in
State v. Jones and, in any event, SORNA now occupied the field, imposing a clear
federal mandate of registration. In addition to SORNA, through the cooperation
among tribes and states, no fewer than four separate mechanisms for tracking sex
offenders on tribal lands had been established to ensure that Indian reservations
would not become "safe haven[s] for sex offenders. 65
IV. TRIBES AS SORNA REGISTRATION JURISDICTIONS
In addition to recognizing tribal court convictions, section 127 of SORNA
attempts to track the existing jurisdictional framework on Indian lands, but does so
in a way that grossly oversimplifies the complex distribution of authorities.
SORNA creates two classes of tribes: (1) those subject to Public Law 280
jurisdiction in the six mandatory Public Law 280 states (Minnesota, Wisconsin,
the Adam Walsh Act added "felony child abuse and neglect" to the list of crimes enumerated in the
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, over which the federal government has jurisdiction.
62 See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 403
(2004) (disagreeing with the U.S. Sentencing Commission's general refusal to accord respect to tribal
court convictions and sentences in criminal history calculations).
63 See Kevin K. Washburn, A Different Kind of Symmetry, 34 N.M. L. REv. 263 (2004)
(noting that state and federal courts seem more willing to respect tribal court criminal judgments than
civil judgments and arguing that this is difficult to square with traditional notions of due process,
which suggest that criminal defendants are entitled to greater scrutiny of governmental procedure
than civil defendants).
64 The case was ultimately decided by a 3-2-2 vote with no majority opinion. See Jones, 729
N.W. 2d 1 (Minn. 2007). Only the concurrence and dissent explicitly considered federal Indian law
principles. Strikingly, none of the opinions cited the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), which clearly asserted that sex offender statutes are regulatory rather than
criminal in nature.
65 Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Tribes Say They'll Track Sex Offenders, Leaders Working With
State Officials, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 2, 2005, at B3.
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Nebraska, Oregon, California, and Alaska) and (2) all other tribes.66 For tribes in
the first category, authority and responsibility to implement the SORNA on Indian
lands was automatically delegated to the state in which the tribal lands are located.
Tribes in the second category, which included those tribes subject to PL 280
jurisdiction in the voluntary PL 280 states, were given one year to pass a resolution
"elect[ing] to carry out [SORNA] as a jurisdiction subject to its provisions." 67
Those tribes that failed to enact a resolution before the deadline joined the
mandatory PL 280 tribes in the first category, and all responsibility to implement
the SORNA requirements on tribal lands was delegated to the state.68
Of the 562 federally-recognized Indian tribes in the United States, 211 were
eligible to make an election under section 127 of SORNA. The Department of
Justice has reported that 198 of the eligible tribes passed a resolution expressing
their intention to comply with the SORNA mandates. 69 An additional five tribes
passed resolutions delegating their responsibilities under the Act to the states in
which the tribes' lands are located. 70 A number of Indian tribes in mandatory
PL280 jurisdictions, while expressly excluded from making an election under
Section 127, passed resolutions stating their intention to comply with the law and
expressing their opposition to the delegation of their authority to the state.71
Although section 127 included a stringent deadline for tribes to elect to comply
with the SORNA mandates, the law also acknowledged that any tribe that has
made a section 127 election may change its mind at any time and the responsibility
72for implementing SORNA on tribal lands will immediately fall to the state.
SORNA imposes a host of new requirements on participating jurisdictions.73
The Act requires that each jurisdiction use a public website registry, conform its
criminal code to a 3-tiered system for classifying sex offenders, adjust its
registration laws to the registration periods set forth in SORNA, register specified
juvenile offenders, and conduct periodic in-person verification of an offender's
registration information. In addition, SORNA imposes intrusive requirements
regarding personal data that must be included in a jurisdiction's registry. A sex
offender must comply with registration requirements in any jurisdiction where he
was convicted, works, resides, goes to school, or visits for seven days. Required
66 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 127.
67 Id. § 127(a)(l)(A).
6' Id. § 127(a)(2)(B).
69 Leslie Hagen, SMART Office, Dep't of Justice, at the National Tribal Symposium on Sex
Offender Management and Accountability (Mar. 6, 2008).
70 id.
71 See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, TRIBAL RESOLUTIONS PURSUANT TO THE ADAM WALSH
CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT OF 2006, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/tribal-govt-elections.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
72 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 127(a)(2)(B).
73 Some commentators have suggested that these new requirements raise substantial
federalism concerns. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 32.
[Vol 6:3
2008] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRA TION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 15
registration information includes: name, social security number, a photograph,
DNA sample, palm and finger prints, a list of identifying features, home address,
place of employment, conviction information, driver's license number, information
about vehicles to which he has access, email addresses, and any other information
the U.S. Attorney General may require.74
Depending on the class of crime committed, the sex offender will be
responsible for verifying and updating all of his or her registration information
quarterly, biannually, or annually for a minimum of fifteen years for the least
serious offenders, and for life for the most serious offenders.75 Participating
jurisdictions must conform their registration and notification laws to the federal
standards before July 27, 2009. Failure to meet the deadline for compliance will
result in a loss of ten percent of allocated federal law enforcement funding.76 For
tribes that fail to meet the deadline, responsibility and authority under the Act will
be delegated to the state.77
In sum, SORNA has resulted in a massive transfer of tribal authority to states,
without consulting tribes in any significant way. Moreover, tribes retaining
authority to monitor sex offenders on their lands have seen their flexibility to tailor
registration and notification systems to their communities' needs severely
diminished.
V. CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SORNA ON INDIAN LANDS
A. Fragmentation of Jurisdictional Authority
SORNA threw a monkey wrench into the jurisdictional scheme on Indian
reservations. Through inadvertence and ignorance of the complex jurisdictional
issues at play, Congress created state regulatory authority that had not previously
existed on some Public Law 280 reservations and arguably created state criminal
authority where it did not previously exist in non-PL 280 jurisdictions. For tribes
in the latter category, SORNA constitutes the only delegation of authority to states
on reservations, dramatically undermining longstanding federal legal principles
providing that Indians on reservations are subject to tribal or federal authority, but
never state authority.78  It also undermines the baseline principle that only the
federal and tribal governments can bring criminal actions against Indians for on-
reservation criminal activity.79
74 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 114.
71 Id. § 115.
76 Id. § 125(a).
77 Id. § 127 (a)(2)(C).
78 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
79 Cf Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (articulating the principle, never articulated
previously, that state law enforcement officials have authority to enter an Indian reservation to
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In addition, as a result of SORNA, regulatory authority in some PL 280
jurisdictions is now divided among two different sovereigns-state and tribal-
instead of just one (tribal). Still worse, on Indian Country reservations not subject
to state jurisdiction under PL 280, criminal authority will now potentially be
divided not just between two but between three different sovereigns, dramatically
increasing the coordination problems that inevitably occur when jurisdictional
authority is fragmented. Adding to the confusion, section 127 creates a system
where tribes are situated differently as a matter of law within a state or between
states, depending on their status under PL 280 and their election under section 127
of SORNA. Moreover, for some tribes who have reservation lands extending
across state borders, the treatment may cause even more confusion, which is a
problem for the handful of tribes that have lands in both PL 280 and non-PL 280
states. The Fort Mojave and Quechan tribes, for example, both have lands that
straddle the border of California, which is a mandatory PL 280 jurisdiction, and
Arizona, which is not. According to the Department of Justice both tribes passed
resolutions expressing their intent to comply with the mandates in SORNA.
Numerous studies have concluded that the complexity of the jurisdictional
rules on Indian reservations creates significant impediments to effective law
enforcement.80 Each criminal investigation involves a cumbersome procedure to
establish who has jurisdiction over the case according to the nature of the offense
committed, the identity of the offender, the identity of the victim, and the legal
status of the land where the crime took place. The first law enforcement officials
called to the scene are often tribal police or BIA officers, and these officers may
initiate investigations and/or detain a suspect. Then a decision has to be made
whether the crime is of the type warranting involvement by the FBI or state law
enforcement. The officers then decide whether to refer the case to the tribal
prosecutor, the U.S. Attorney's office, or the local district attorney. SORNA
complicates this regime by, in essence, cherry-picking one particular type of
offense and treating it differently than all the others.
B. Destabilization of Existing Law Enforcement Regimes
Effective law enforcement on Indian reservations requires a high degree of
coordination among sovereigns.81 Such coordination has proven very difficult to
establish and maintain. In some areas cooperative agreements and memoranda of
investigate a crime involving an Indian only if they are investigating crimes that occurred outside the
reservation).
go See, e.g., MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 3.
81 See Kevin K. Washburn, Testimony on Law Enforcement in Indian Country before the
United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 11 0th Congress, 1st Session (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030908 (generally explaining the importance of cooperation between tribal
governments and their state and local counterparts in police work in Indian Country).
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understanding have been negotiated among state, tribal, and federal governments
to facilitate this coordination. These agreements vary greatly in their details, but
are grounded in the shared recognition that tribes, states, and counties can enhance
their law enforcement efforts by working collaboratively. 82 Nearly all tribal justice
agencies have at least one cross-deputization agreement in place with another
jurisdiction. 83 Many of these agreements provide for the deputization of tribal
police officers who meet certain minimum qualification and training requirements
as state or county officers, so that tribal police can enforce state criminal law on
Indian reservations. These agreements may also address data-sharing issues, the
execution of search and arrest warrants on Indian reservations, and establish
policies for "hot pursuit." 84 Unfortunately, historic hostilities and mistrust between
tribes and the states persist in some areas, and this type of negotiated coordination
has not been possible.
Most of these agreements are attempts to work around structural and
jurisdictional problems that no rational planner would voluntarily create. Yet,
through inadvertence, Congress has created, in SORNA, yet another obstacle for
which tribes will need to enter into still more jurisdictional agreements to make
workable.
SORNA has the potential to destabilize many of these carefully negotiated
agreements by redistributing civil and criminal authority for managing sex
offenders. Because the law establishes a different distribution of authority for
registration violation crimes, officers may find themselves in a situation in which
they do not have access to state registry information or lack the authority to
enforce state law if the situation involves an offender who has violated the state
registration laws. As a practical matter, law enforcement officers are likely to be
confused by the new approach to jurisdiction for sex offender registration on tribal
lands. In many places, state authorities will have this authority for the first time,
and a long period of adjustment can be expected.
Section 127 of SORNA ignores the coordination that is necessary between
state, local, and tribal authorities and instead treats tribes and states as inter-
changeable for purposes of implementation of the law. This approach ignores the
pivotal role the tribal government should play in ensuring the successful
implementation of the national sex offender registration system on their lands.
Consider, for example, the tribal responsibilities inherent in such a scheme: First,
even where a state has full authority under SORNA on tribal lands, the state will
depend on the tribal courts to notify offenders of their registration obligation.
82 Id.
83 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, ninety-nine percent of tribes participating in
the census reported cross-deputization agreements with other agencies. STEVEN PERRY, supra note
46.
84 See National Congress of American Indians, available at
http://www.ncai.org/LawEnforcementAgreements.100.0.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2008)
(collecting law enforcement agreements between tribes and neighboring jurisdictions).
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Second, the tribal detention facilities will be housing offenders that must be
entered into the state registry. Third, the state will need access to tribal registries,
many of which are not electronic. Most importantly, the tribal or BIA law
enforcement officers will be the officers most likely in need of information on
registrants for investigation purposes and best positioned to assist registration
personnel with tracking down non-compliant registrants. The state likely will not
have an infrastructure in place on tribal lands to register and track sex offenders.
Since meeting these responsibilities is costly and requires cooperation between
those with formal authority (the state) and those with actual information (the tribe),
registration could easily fall between the cracks, with the tribe indicating that the
state is responsible and the state blaming the tribe for any lack of cooperation.
The creation of the seamless nationwide sex offender registration and tracking
system envisioned by SORNA will require states, tribes, and the federal
government to work together to negotiate a number of issues including: the details
of the process for initial registration, digitization of information required to be
collected including tribal codes, procedures for verification of registration
information on Indian reservations, and how information will be shared across
state, tribal, and federal jurisdictions. A high degree of coordination will be
required between state and tribal officials if tribal offenders are to be included in
the state system. In many places, this coordination does not currently exist, and
information-sharing between states and tribes has been a controversial issue.
C. Intrusion on Tribal Sovereignty
In sum, SORNA significantly intrudes on tribal sovereignty and self-
government and does so in an era when Congress has increasingly realized the
importance of recognizing a key role for tribes in implementation of federal
programs on Indian reservations. The intrusion is difficult to square normatively
with current federal Indian law and policy.
It likely was not intended to be such an intrusion. It was an inadvertent
outcome made in a rush to take action.85 Congressional committees failed to focus
closely on the tribal impacts of the Adam Walsh language. Indeed, the only
testimony on the effects of the bill on tribes was not related to SORNA, but on the
new punishments for federal sex offenses.8 6  Congressional ignorance and the
85 Another scholar has noted that Congress failed to consider empirical data that might bear
on the effectiveness of the statute. See Logan, supra note 32, at 15 ("One of the most striking
features of the nation's modem rush to embrace registration and notification is the utter disregard of
empiricism.").
86 Protection Against Sexual Exploitation of Children Act of 2005 and Prevention and
Deterrence of Crimes Against Children Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2318 and H.R. 2388 Before the
Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 38-39 (2005) (statement of John Rhodes, Assistant Federal Defender, District of Montana).
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inability of tribes to be heard in congressional hearings cost tribes dearly.17 It will
also necessarily have an impact on the effectiveness of SORNA. In most places in
which states have new-found jurisdiction under SORNA, they will have great
difficulty meeting their obligations without substantial tribal assistance. A more
effective regime would recognize tribes, rather than states, as the default authority
for sex offender registration.
VI. OTHER PROBLEMS ON THE HORIZON
While SORNA creates an unworkable and likely ineffective jurisdictional
structure and adds additional complexity to an already very complicated regime, it
faces several other practical problems as well.
A. SORNA and Federal Law Enforcement and Corrections
One complexity left unaddressed in SORNA is the role that the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA or Bureau) will play in registering and tracking sex offenders.
Many tribes rely on the BIA to provide law enforcement, judicial, and detention
services on tribal lands. 88 The BIA funds fifty-nine detention facilities on tribal
lands and directly operates twenty.89 Forty-seven tribal law enforcement programs
are BIA-operated, and an additional 154 programs are BIA-funded.90 Forty-six
tribal communities are served by BIA-operated courts.9 Neither SORNA nor the
implementation guidelines proposed by the Department of Justice address what, if
any, role the BIA will play in sex offender management on tribal lands and how
offenders convicted in BIA-run courts or housed in BIA detention facilities will be
registered.
SORNA mandates that "an appropriate official shall, shortly before the
release of the sex offender from custody, or if the sex offender is not in custody,
immediately after the sentencing of the sex offender .. . ensure that the sex
offender is registered. 92 However, under the Proposed Guidelines released by the
Department of Justice in May 2007,93 federal courts and correction facilities will
87 See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV.
777, 793-96 (2006) (arguing that tribes are sometimes subject to the whims of national policy and
urging tribes to board the rapidly moving "freight trains that move federal policy" or risk being struck
by them).
88 PERRY, supra note 46.
89 Guillermo Rivera, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Testimony before the National Prison Rape
Elimination Commission, Mar. 26, 2007.
90 PERRY, supra note 46.
91 Id.
92 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 117(a)(3),
120 Stat. 587 (2006).
93 The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification-Proposed
Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 103 (May 30, 2007).
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not be obliged to comply with this provision. Rather, federal corrections officials
will merely provide federal sex offenders with notice that the individual must
register within three days in the appropriate state or tribal jurisdictions. 94
Today, over sixty percent of federal sex offense cases occur in Indian
Country, and the majority of such offenders will return to Indian reservations. If
the Department of Justice adheres to the view that federal prisons are exempt from
the requirement to register offenders prior to release, this would disproportionately
burden Indian communities. If the need for national uniformity is one of the
primary justifications for SORNA, it makes little sense to exempt federal prisons.
B. Tribal Resources for Implementation
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing tribal communities attempting to
implement SORNA is the cost. Because of a desire to preserve tribal authority vis-
A-vis the states, many tribes have opted-in as registration jurisdictions under
section 127 even though they likely will not have the capacity to meet the onerous
requirements set out in SORNA without a substantial expenditure of resources. An
unfunded mandate is troubling enough for a state, but most states have a significant
income or property tax base. Since American Indian communities are among the
poorest in the United States, few tribal governments impose income taxes on tribal
members. Since tribal land is often held in trust by the federal government, tribal
governments lack the authority to impose an effective property tax regime. Thus,
tribes lack significant tax bases that could fund implementation. If sex crimes rates
tend to follow poverty rates, then the greatest burden may well fall on the poorest
tribes.
Tribes also face substantial technological and infrastructure issues. The states
and territories have had more than ten years to build the sex offender management
systems that will be modified and updated to comply with SORNA. Many tribes,
however, are starting from scratch, and it will be extremely costly for Indian tribes
to build the infrastructure necessary to comply with the law's mandates. To date,
no money has been made available from the Department of Justice to assist tribes
in complying with the law.96 In addition, appropriations for implementing the law
were cut in FY 2008 from more than $20 million to just over $4 million, making it
' Id. at pt. IX.
93 LAWRENCE PIERSOL ET AL., REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERicAN ADVISORY GROUP (2003),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/NAAG/NativeAmer.pdf (Larry Piersol is the federal judge who was
the Chairman of the Advisory Group).
96 The SMART office released a grant solicitation for Adam Walsh Act implementation in
Indian Country in the fall of 2007. In the spring of 2008, it announced awards of $11.8 million to
state and tribal governments, approximately $2 million of which was designated for individual Indian
tribes. United States Dep't of Justice, DOJ Announces $11.8 Million to Help State and Tribal
Governments Comply with Adam Walsh Act, PRESS RELEASE, (Apr. 28, 2008). The SMART office is
expected to announce a second round of grants in September 2008, some of which will also be
awarded to Indian tribes.
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increasingly unlikely that significant funding will be made available prior to the
2009 compliance deadline. Moreover, unlike the states, federal law limits the
ability of tribes to raise governmental revenue through the levy of taxes in
significant ways that will make it difficult for tribes to offset the financial burdens
arising from the statute.97 As a result, many tribal governments may be forced to
divert limited tribal public safety resources away from other priorities. 98 Or, more
likely, they will be compelled to opt-in and submit their sovereign authority to
states.
For some tribes, the "digital divide" long prevented tribes from even
considering the possibility of being part of the system that SORNA envisions.
99
While the digital divide has decreased with improvements in inexpensive
communications technology, compliance with SORNA will require tribes to have
access to the National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR) maintained by the FBI and
other federal criminal information databases. Currently, Indian tribes can access
the federal databases only by going through the state in which the tribe is located.
Some tribes have been able to negotiate agreements with state governments to gain
this access. These agreements vary between states, with some states charging
substantial sums or requiring criminal information sharing before granting access
to the tribes. Many tribes have been unable to negotiate an agreement with the
state. As a result, they effectively are shut out of the federal criminal databases.
Indian tribes have been advocating for direct access to the federal database for
years, and a provision was included in VAWA stating that the "Attorney General
shall permit Indian law enforcement agencies, in cases of domestic violence,
dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking, to enter information into Federal
criminal information databases and to obtain information from the databases."
However, the FBI continues to assert that tribes can only access the databases by
negotiating with the state.' °°
A census of tribal justice agencies conducted by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics in 2002 found that fifty-four tribes were submitting information on tribal
sex offenders to the National Sex Offender Registry.' 0' However, less than twelve
percent of tribes were electronically connected to jurisdictions off the reservation;
nearly half of tribal justice agencies reported that they do not have access to the
97 See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (holding that tribe lacked
authority to impose hotel occupancy tax on nonmembers on fee land within the reservation even
though the tribe provided fire protection and other governmental services).
98 The profound resource need for Indian Country justice systems has been well documented.
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Law Enforcement
Services, Gap Analysis Data (2006) (on file with author).
99 Therese Bissell, Note, The Digital Divide Dilemma: Preserving Native American Culture
While Increasing Access to Information Technology on Reservations, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y
129 (2004).
100 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Comments at the "Government-to-Government
Consultation on Violent Crime in Indian Country" (March 5, 2008).
101 PERRY, supra note 46.
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National Criminal Information Center database, and only fourteen tribes reported
that they were routinely sharing crime statistics with the state or local governments
or the FBI. 102 In addition, the vast majority of tribal law enforcement agencies are
still using ink and paper fingerprinting techniques that will have to be upgraded to
LiveScan technology before tribes can comply with SORNA.
VII. CONCLUSION
The legislative atmosphere around sex offender management regimes has
rarely been deliberative. The political pressure to avoid looking soft on sex
offenders has created a legislative rush to enact ever more stringent sex registration
laws. For the most part, the dysfunctional process has redounded to the
disadvantage of the offenders themselves. Since they are perhaps the least
sympathetic figures in the entire criminal justice system, the public is not overly
concerned if the laws have a harsh edge. However, the process used in this
particular law may have other serious ramifications. While many would suggest
that the rushed efforts to enact SORNA are justified because of the magnitude of
the problem, SORNA shows that the non-deliberative process used may have a
significant negative impact on victims and tribes.
First, it should be obvious that an under-theorized legislative initiative that
falls to anticipate real world problems is less likely to be successful. If Congress is
concerned about preventing sex offenses and preventing future victimization, then
it ought to work harder to create a workable system. In its haste to show resolve
on an important issue of public policy, Congress has failed to work through the
difficult questions of how to build an effective system. Offenders will fall through
the large practical gaps created in the SORNA regime. Since a registration system
is at least partially designed as a means to help prevent future offenses, we can
anticipate that an ineffective regime will manifest in fewer sex offenses prevented.
The sex offender who falls through the cracks may claim more victims. In other
words, congressional haste may have a tragic consequence: a greater number of
sex offenses that might have been prevented.
The second significant drawback is related but concerns a different
constituency. SORNA has undermined tribal sovereignty and self-government.
While tribal sovereignty and self-government are compelling normative principles
standing alone, the United States has also come to recognize that their value has
enormous practical, not just symbolic, importance. Federal respect for tribal
sovereignty and self-governance simply represents good government.
Federal Indian policy in the last thirty-five years has been premised largely on
the notion that tribes are the best primary providers of services to Indian people.
While all governmental services are better handled by officials who are
accountable to the communities they serve, law enforcement in particular is an
102 Id.
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"insider's game."'10 3 As the community policing movement has demonstrated, law
enforcement works far better when law enforcement is embedded in the fabric of
communities. SORNA runs counter to these widely respected principles. Under
the SORNA regime, the officials charged with enforcement will very often be
outsiders, state officials who are less invested in and less sophisticated about tribal
communities.
SORNA ought to be revisited. Because it would have been tailored to the
unique problems of Indian reservations and allowed each tribe to develop a system
that works best given its unique circumstances, the National Tribal Registry
authorized by VAWA might have been a much better model for tribal participation
in sex offense registries. If Congress is interested in preventing Indian reservations
from becoming gaps in an otherwise seamless nationwide sex offender registration
system, then it must look beyond mere form to actual practice. The system created
by SORNA is formally seamless, but practically useless.
A far more effective approach, and one that would also begin to address other
problems with public safety and law enforcement, would be to create real
incentives for tribal and state law enforcement agents to work together. 104 Though
the work was largely made irrelevant in light of SORNA and the outcome in State
v. Jones, the Minnesota example shows that tribes and states can work well
together to address the serious problem that sex offenses pose to tribal
communities. Initiatives developed organically at the local level can be adjusted to
fit the needs of diverse tribal communities and are far more likely to produce actual
compliance and effective management than a formal and uniform top-down
mandate from federal officials. SORNA should be reconsidered with the practical
realities of Indian reservations in mind.
The tragic irony in congressional implementation of sex offender registration
on Indian reservations through SORNA is that the dysfunctional outcomes are
likely to be most apparent on Indian reservations. Tribal victims of sex crimes are
likely to suffer most. Given that the magnitude of sex offenses in Indian
communities may be greater on a per capita basis than in other communities in the
United States and that it was sex offenses in tribal communities that first brought
sex offender registration to congressional attention, tribal interests ought to be
considered in devising an effective program. Difficult issues such as sex offender
management should be met with real deliberation and real financial appropriations.
103 Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 911 (2006) (noting that criminal justice systems are run by insiders who have access to
much greater information than outsiders and inevitably hold information tightly to maintain control).
104 See Washburn, supra note 80 (generally explaining the importance of greater cooperation
between tribal governments and their state and local counterparts in police work in Indian country).
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